In the Annals of Troubled Military Programs, This One Takes the Cake

As I have mentioned a number of times that I spent some time working on the recovery and maintenance vehicle for the now-canceled Future Combat Systems (FCS).

Well, no matter how misbegotten, it appears that the program reappears with a different name a few years later.

Case in point is the replacement for the FCS, the Ground Combat Vehicle, GCV, which is different largely in only one area, it no longer needs to fly on a C-130, so the 20 ton maximum weight for shipping has gone by the wayside.

This is not surprising. After all replacing the 30 ton weight class M2/M3 with a vehicle with superior mobility and protection is difficult to do in ⅔ the weight of its predecessor, all while reducing the cost of operation, is a tough nut to crack.

It's clear that they will be going with a remotely operated turret, and without the space for the gunner and commander and the turret penetration, it makes it rather simple to fix a rather prominent shortcoming of the Bradley, its inability to carry a full 9 soldier infantry squad.

So the Pentagon is are back to square, which means fighting the wheels/tracks war yet again, though it appears that the military is favoring a tracked vehicle.

The advantages of tracks are better off road mobility, better performance in an active city conflict, since it can go over a road block made from cars or trucks, and a wheeled vehicle cannot, and more volumetric efficiency, since the wheel travel is less, and you do not need to accommodate the swept volume of the wheels which pivot to steer.

The disadvantages are operating costs, noise, weight and speed on roads.

That being said, one huge advantage for tracks is that if your infantry fighting vehicle grows into a 70 ton behemoth, wheels just won't work at all:

The U.S. Army's chief of staff wants to put the service's Ground Combat Vehicle program on a diet.

Gen. George Casey said he thinks the future replacement for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle needs to be much lighter than the estimated 70 tons program officials are projecting that the new GCV will weigh.
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"I keep saying, 'Look, man, an MRAP [mine-resistant ambush-protected] is about 23 tons, and you're telling me this is going to be 70 tons, which is the same as an [M1] Abrams. Surely we can get a level of protection between that, that is closer to the MRAP than it is the M1,' " Casey said June 7. "It's not going to be a super heavyweight vehicle."

It would also be unaffordable. I would suggest that if the army really needs a better vehicle, that it procures new-build/rebuilt Bradleys, with the crewed turret replaced with something like the CTI tele-operated turret, and with enhanced armor based on the non-homogeneous armor technologies developed for the M-1 Abrams and the original FCS program.

You would still probably end up with less than a 40 ton weight, and you would get the capability you need at a much lower cost.

Meanwhile in the somewhat less sexy areas of folding in a few drones and an advanced network-based radio called JTRS as part of what is now called the, "Brigade Combat Team Modernization, the House Armed Services Committee is cutting this because of poor performance and cost escalation.

Once again, it's over budget, behind schedule, and not performing.

So on the little things, where the Pentagon knows what needs to be done, they are not executing, and on the big programs, they don't have a clue as to what they want.

Count me in Barney Frank's and Ron Paul's corner. We need to slash military spending.

I would also add that we need to somehow or other put adults in charge of the procurement process.

GD Pitches Stryker for FCS Replacement

I think that the idea of an upgraded an uparmored Stryker to replace the now-canceled FCS is a very bad idea.

The problem is that Strykers, which now tip the scales at less than 25 tons when extra armor is added on, but it looks like an upgraded Stryker would weigh somewhere between 30 and 35 tons, and when considering that the original vehicle, the LAV, weighed about 15 tons, I think that it would be just too heavy.

Simply replacing the manned turret on the Bradley IFV with an unmanned one, and using the space that is opened up for more troops gets you there, and there is probably some space left over for the communications gear that was developed along with the FCS.

Remnants of Future Combat System Grow More Expensive

The costs of the "Brigade Combat Teams" are escalating, according to the CBO.

When I worked on FCS,^* they were called a "Unit of Action," and I didn't get it then.

The final word on this is in the final 'graph of the linked post:

And the kicker? While the BCTs are supposed to be able to deploy faster to meet immediate needs, the report contends that while they will be able to respond more quickly than the Division model currently in use, “they require roughly the same amount of time to transport their equipment overseas.”

FCS, the gift that keeps giving.


^*Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, "wrecker" variant of the FCS-MGV^† from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).
^†Future Combat Systems-Manned Ground Vehicle. These are the ones that are the tanks and APCs. As opposed to the various unnmanned vehicles, networking technologies, etc. that form the full FCS along with the MGVs.^‡
‡Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can't hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as "technical hit man", where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.

Rumors of FCS Cuts

According to this report, half of the FCS-MGVs models would be significantly delayed, with only the NLOS-C (howitzer), C2V (command post), RSV (reconnaissance), and the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) staying in the pipeline.

This would mean that the MCS (tank), both medical variants, the mortar carrier, and the FRMV^* recovery vehicle would be placed in limbo.

This makes sense. The howitzer is the most advanced, being given an aggressive development schedule following the demise of the Crusader, and the C2V and RSV are most heavily tied into the net-centric warefare.

As to the ICV, it carries a 9 person infantry squad, as opposed to the 6 person capacity of the Bradley (because if its manned turret), and the army has found this inconvenient in combat operations, to say the least, because it meant dispatching 2 IFVs if you wanted to send a full squad somewhere, so it actually would be a significant improvement over its predecessor.

Of course, there are a lot of unmanned turrets on the market now, and you could get the same for less by retrofitting them to the Bradley.

^*Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, "wrecker" variant of the FCS-MGV^† from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).
^†Future Combat Systems-Manned Ground Vehicle. These are the ones that are the tanks and APCs. As opposed to the various unnmanned vehicles, networking technologies, etc. that form the full FCS along with the MGVs.^‡
‡Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can't hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as "technical hit man", where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.

Military Industry Complex Bullsh%$: FCS Armor Edition

It appears that the good folks at Aberdeen Proving Ground just set up a petting zoo for the press with a dog and pony show on the high tech armor for the manned ground vehicles (FCS-MGV).

I have no doubt that this armor will be more effective on a per unit weight and a per thickness basis, but the following is a flat out lie:

All these materials had apparently been used in the search to create the “B” armor for FCS. They are using what is called B-1 armor now and plan to come up with two more variants, using B-3 as the main armor once the FCS vehicles make it to LRIP in fiscal 2013. B-1 provides, a very careful public affairs officer told me, protection roughly equivalent to the Chobham armor on the Abrams tanks. The next variants should be much lighter and provide even greater protection.

(emphasis mine)

Simply put, you are not going to get higher armor levels out of a 25-30 ton vehicle than you do out of a 70 ton vehicle, the laws of physics.

It could be that they are factoring in the effects of an active protection system (which could be easily retrofitted to legacy vehicles) and greater situational awareness (which also could be easily retrofitted to legacy vehicles), but if they are, they are ignoring the realities of modern combat (IEDs, EFPs, and an insurgent enemy who has information superiority).

In other words, it's a lie.

Robert Gates Says Procurement Cuts Necessary

He says that we have to close the “Money Spigot” and he's refused to endorse FCS or the next-generation bomber.

Good. They are useless in any foreseeable near term conflict, though some of the technologies, particularly with regard to communications could be folded into military operations.

Because the Real Battle is Not in Iraq or Afghanistan....

It's in the halls of Congress, where the procurement of bloated weapons systems must be supported at all cost, because otherwise how would the generals get their cushy consultant gigs after they retire.

Case in point, the PR offensive being launched by the US Army in support of the Future Combat System (FCS).

Gates and Murtha Back More Funds For FCS

We have a report that Rep. John Murtha and SecDef Robert Gates are supporting the acceleration of the Future Combat System in order to apply the technologies to Iraq and (particularly) Afghanistan.

What the story appears to be saying is that they want to get the improved communications and sensors capabilities into the hands of soldiers.

While I can see the advantage of this, fundamentally, the subtext here is that this is being suggested as an alternative to boots on the ground, which is a losing proposition.

One of the major problems in US counterinsurgency is that we do not commit enough ground troops, and so, we overuse air assets, which, because of collateral damage, strengthen local support for the insurgency.

Pulling the money out of whiz bang, and out of Air Force combat operations in theater, would be a much more effective use of resources.

Russia Unveils FCS Killer RPG

The folks at Danger Room quote the Russian descriptions as an "Abrams Killer", but the RPG-30 is really designed to defeat active protective systems and reactive armor, neither of which are currently used on the M-1, which they note.

It's pretty simple in concept. The RPG-30 launches two projectiles, the main 105mm projectile, and a smaller decoy, which it launches a few milliseconds ahead of it.

It would serve as a decoy against active protection systems, which intercept incoming rounds, and with even a tiny warhead, and it looks to be about 30mm in diameter, so there is space for this, it could serve to pre-detonate reactive armor, allowing for better function of the main charge.

Neat technology, and another nail in the FCS manned ground vehicle concept of substituting technology for armor.

George W. Bush Broke Our Army

That's, or at the least the conclusion that the US Army is broken, is the conclusion of well respected army analyst Andrew Krepinevich in a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments report.

His basic points:

• The quality of enlisted men and officers is decreasing despite significant pay hikes.
• Physical, educational, and "moral" (i.e. criminal conviction) standards have been lowered for recruits.
• NCO quality is suffering, because enlisted men ill suited to leadership are being promoted to NCO status.
• Falling reenlistment numbers.
• Increased use of stop loss to maintain staffing levels.
• The Army is attempting to create units that are simultaneously configured for both conventional and counterinsurgency warfare, and thus under performing at both.

He does not explicitly finger Bush, but Iraq is clearly mentioned as a part of the problem.

His recommendations:

• Make 15 Army BCTs dediucated to counter-insurgency/peacekeeping.
• Delay expanding the army until personnel quality issues are resolved.
• Cancel the FCS, which has dubious utility in a counter-insurgency scenario, and is sucking up too much budget.

It is likely that the ill effects of Iraq will weigh on the army for more than a decade.

Another Problem With FCS

David Axe notes a potential problem with the NLOS-C (Non Line of Sight-Cannon), the Howitzer variant of the the Future Combat System Manned Ground Vehicles (FCS-MGV) which the Army intends to have replace nearly all existing US armored vehicles.

Specifically, by virtue of the high level of sophistication and automation, the NLOS-C has a crew of only two, as compared to 4 for the current howitzer, the Paladin.

If the future NLOS-C units reduce their manning requirements to fill the minimum number of people needed to operate the systems without considering the need to maintain continuous operations and endure battle losses, the expensive high-speed cannon might be silent when needed because an adequate number of Soldiers are not available to operate it.

A commenter on his blog notes that for for a 6 tube battery, you have 42 men, 4 per paladin, and 3 on each of the 6 ammunition carriers, for a total of 42 men.

For NLOS-C, with automated firing and loading, this is likely down to 24 men, possibly fewer depending on how the army allocates loading vehicles, and the loss of one man on any of these vehicles will likely take that out of action.

With the current setup, the Paladin and its loading vehicles can operate at reduced capacity with short crews. The same is not realistic with a lone crewman operating a vehicle.

Additionally, in a situation like Iraq and Afghanistan, which is still the most likely conflict scenario, it is likely that these troops would not just be assigned to artillery duty, but also to, "non-standard missions, which require the Soldiers to anything from patrols to base security", which, "demand at least the current number of Soldiers, if not more, to complete such missions."

It appears that one of the institutional myths present in Pentagon doctrine is that the individual soldier is ruinously expensive, and replacing him/her with technology or private contractors will create a more effective, and more cost effective war fighting force.

The performance of systems and reduced crews, in addition to the performance of mercenaries private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven this assumption to be disastrously wrong.

Major Army Strategist Savages Future Combat System*

Col. H.R. McMaster, a, "is a highly influential soldier-scholar who is currently putting together a brain trust for Gen. David Petraeus to review U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan," just released a blistering paper condemning the direction of the US military.

He believes that the folks who support the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which espouses high tech communications, surveillance, and precision weapons at the expense of boots on the ground is are profoundly wrong, and unclear on what is actually going on the ground right now.

He also cuts the flyboyz in the USAF a new one while he's at it.

Good read, check it out.

^*Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, "wrecker" variant of the FCS-MGV^* from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).

DoD and Army Fight Over Tank Purchases

Basically, the Army wants to shift $1 billion from M-1 Abrams procurement to the FCS program, and the DoD is rather unimpressed at the concept.

As has been made clear here by me many times, I'm on the side of the DoD.

I think that the FCS Manned Ground Vehicles are not well suited to currently foreseeable conflicts.

To pay for this, the Army would drop plans to upgrade hundreds of Abrams tanks and scrap a last planned purchase of at least 30 new tanks, saving a total of $1 billion through 2013. As well, it would slash planned purchases of Strykers, saving $1.3 billion, and reduce purchases and upgrades of Bradley Fighting Vehicles, saving $417 million.

The DoD comptroller's office is especially opposed to cutting Abrams funds, a senior Pentagon official said.

Of course, the army is arguing that the FCS, weighing just 25-30t to the Abrams' 70 t, is more survivable:

"The MGVs will provide the soldier with an array of crew protection, to include advanced lightweight armor composites, crew mine blast protection, active protection systems, thermal management and radar. Most important, the FCS network provides better situational awareness, allowing soldiers to engage targets at greater distances," said FCS communications manager Paul Mehney.

But this is crap.

In a counterinsurgency campaign, the insurgents always have better intel. They choose where and when to attack, and at that point, the network is not a substitute for armor.

Besides, the network can be retrofitted into existing vehicles for less cost.

NLOS-C Prototype Fires First Round

They have validated the concept with mockups and breadboards (It's why you see the cables running out of the back of those vehicles) but this does represent a step forward for the howitzer variant of the Future Combat System:

The mobile cannon, which is crewed by two soldiers, has a fully automated ammunition loading system and on-board projectile tracking. Lieutenant Colonel Robert McVay, Army Product Manager for NLOS-C said in a statement that “This marks the first 155mm round fired from a fully automated howitzer mounted on an FCS hybrid-electric chassis and remotely commanded through its on-board computers and controls.”

You will note in the picture that this is not the full up model firing, but one of the breadboard models, note the cables out the rear.

Future Combat System Reworked

Basically, this is an acknowledgment that the program as currently was ill conceived (see here and here).

They will be accellerating the small airborn and ground vehicles, and soft pedaling the armored vehicles:

The moves will shift the focus of the overall FCS effort to infantry brigades instead of armored units. The Army will also work to get large numbers of robots and miniature aerial drones -- both of which are designed for use in crowded urban areas -- out to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by late 2010, instead of in 2015 or 2016 as initially planned.

This is an admission that it will be infantry, and not armored units that will be necessary in the most likely future war fighting scenarios.

The manned ground vehicles will be small and lighter, and so in a number of ways inferior to their predecessors, so this should come as no surprise.

FCS MGV Update

You can get a good summary of the progress of the NLOS-C howitzer and NLOS-M mortar here, and things seem to be proceeding well, with the tube and the autoloader performing well.

Some pics of the NLOS-C:




FWIW, I don't think that the FCS MGV (Future Combat System -- Manned Ground Vehicle) is a particularly good idea. These platforms will be more expensive than their predecessors, but lighter weight, half the weight of a Bradley, 1/3 of the weight of an Abrams, so they will be more vulnerable to things like IEDs.

The systems they contain, communications and sensors, not the hybrid drive system, do have military value, and I expect them to see service, but it's cheaper, and to my mind more militarily advantageous to retrofit the boxes on existing systems.

As to whether the military will buy any of these, I think yes, but only the NLOS-C, because the artillery folks at the military are currently using a vehicle first fielded in 1963, the M109 Paladin, and with the Crusader cancellation in the late 1990s, it's still their turn.

I don't think that the rest will be manufactured, though the ICV (Infantry Combat Vehicle) is in one very significant way, it carries a full infantry fire team of 9, as opposed to the Bradley's 6, because of space freed up by making the turret remotly operated.

You could retrofit a Bradley with a new turret for the same effect though.

First FCS NLOS- C Howitzer to be Unveiled

This is, I think, the only variant of the FCS manned ground vehicle (FCS-MGV) at all likely to see large scale production.

The artillery Mafia in the Army have been clamoring for a replacement for the M109 Paladin for years, and the downsides of the FCS-MGV in a counter-insurgency scenario really do not apply to this vehicle, as a self propelled Howitzer should never be in a position where it would be in close contact with the populace.

That being said, it would have been far cheaper to buy something from our European allies.

Neat Tech: FCS Edition

In this case, this is actually a potentially useful military technology, specifically what is called the Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) system.

These are a family of disposable/deployable sensor ranging in size from something a bit smaller than a shoe box to about the size of a cigarette pack:

The UGS come in two forms, the Tactical UGS and the Urban UGS. Tactical have four different versions, including the ISR node, which contains magnetic, seismic, and acoustic sensors; the Gateway node which is a communications relay system; an Electro-optics node with an EO camera for the day and an infrared camera for night; and a Radiological/Nuclear node. The Tactical UGS are about a foot long and several inches wide (exact specs are classified), and are typically partially buried so they aggressor units can’t see them while passing by. Urban UGS are smaller, and are placed on walls inside buildings to monitor rooms already cleared by soldiers. The two UGS send data back to the Gateway, which then processes the information and send its out through the FCS communications system.

The basic objective of the technology is to create a networked picture of the battlefield.

Situational awarness is frequently the most important part of winning a battle, but when one considers that any foreseeable conflict in the immediate future will be a counterinsurgency operation, where US forces would be operating at an information disadvantage that will not be helped by this sort of technology.

Future Combat System Facing Funding Cut

The House Armed Services Committee is sticking with the 5% cut in funding recommended by the Airland Subcommittee, and it's likely that the house as a whole will stick with the cut.

Good idea. While some of the technologies are intriguing, the program as a whole is bloated, over ambitious, over budget, and over schedule.

Full disclosure, I worked on FCS from 2003-2006.<sup>*

*</sup>Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can't hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as "technical hit man", where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.

Army Moving to Linux on FCS

While I think that this is a good idea, it appears that they have been creating this system, and the associated network, without thought of how to integrate it with the existing legacy Windows systems.

It's kind of typical for FCS, putting the proverbial cart before the horse.